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Vietnamese Local State-owned Enterprises (SOEs)1 at the Crossroads: 
Implications of SOE Restructuring at the Local Level 
 
Futaba Ishizuka 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is widely acknowledged that Vietnam’s SOE sector underwent a large-scale 
restructuring in the early 1990s.  At that time, the main target of the restructuring drive 
were the numerous small local SOEs suffering from chronic deficits.  In recent years, 
SOE restructuring is again gathering momentum.  Assuming that major features of this 
stage of SOE restructuring can be described as “keeping the big and releasing the 
small,”2 it seems almost inevitable that local SOEs that are generally smaller scale 
relative to their central counterparts will once again be the main focus of the renewed 
restructuring efforts.   
 This paper aims to capture the changing features of local SOEs under the 
national SOE restructuring program in the 2000s.  It turns out that this indeed seems to 
be a critical juncture for local SOEs.  It is not just that the presence of the local SOE 
sector has been rapidly shrinking in many aspects.  The current SOE restructuring 
seems to be actually transforming the role of local SOEs in the economy into one that is 
more suited to a market economy, as far as type of business of these enterprises is 
concerned.  Changes, however, are not in a single direction, as the principle of 
“keeping the big” is also being applied to local SOEs.  Nevertheless, at least the raison 
d'être of SOEs has been clarified and narrowed down, which has had a visible impact on 
the sectoral structure of local SOEs.  This can be contrasted with the SOE restructuring 
in the early 1990s where a view to restricting the role of SOEs was apparently lacking.   
 The rest of this paper will be structured as follows: Section 2 looks briefly at 
                                                  
1 In the State-owned Enterprise (SOE) Law before its 2003 amendment, a State-owned 
Enterprise was defined as an economic organization, which is capitalized, set up, 
organized and managed by the state.  According to the 2003 SOE Law, not only state 
companies with 100% state capital, but also joint-stock and limited liability companies 
with dominant state share are classified as SOEs.  Local SOEs are those SOEs under 
local control.  Local SOEs are mainly under provincial People’s Committees, but there 
are also those under local branches of the Communist Party and other organizations, 
district People’s Committees and the like.   
2 Cheshier et al. [2006] borrow this phrase which is originally used in the Chinese SOE 
reform to analyze the SOE reform in Vietnam. 
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the impact of SOE restructuring in the early 1990s on local SOEs and the sectoral 
structure of local SOEs as of 2000; Section 3 examines the SOE restructuring policy in 
the 2000s at the national level as embodied in the three Prime Minister Decisions, as 
well as its application in the provincial master plans; Section 4 refers to statistical data 
to reveal major changes in the local SOE sector between 2000 and 2006; Section 5 takes 
a glimpse at the features of remaining large-scale local SOEs in the mid-1990s; and 
Section 6 summarizes the findings and highlights some issues for future research. 
 
2. Vietnamese local SOE sector up to 2000 
 
2.1 Impact of SOE restructuring in the early 1990s at the local level 
The large-scale SOE restructuring in the early 1990s was initiated by the 
Council of Ministers Decree 388 of 20 November 1991 on the establishment and 
liquidation of SOEs.  This Decree required the heads of ministries and equivalent 
institutions under the Council of Ministers (hereinafter referred to as ministries), and of 
People’s Committees of provinces and centrally controlled cities (hereinafter referred to 
as provinces), to take necessary actions to either re-register or liquidate all SOEs under 
their respective jurisdictions.  The ministers and People’s Committee chairmen were to 
complete application for re-establishment and implementation of liquidation plans 
fundamentally by the end of the first quarter of 1992.3   
The enterprises to be liquidated were those suffering from deficits for many 
years and judged unable to solve this problem by such tactics as changing products, 
reinvesting in equipment or organizational restructuring (including merger with other 
enterprises and transformation into a collective).  For the moment, however, the 
liquidation policy was not applied to large-scale enterprises or those providing 
important products or services, whose closing down would negatively affect other 
economic branches or enterprises.4  There were no clear criteria for what constituted 
“large-scale” or “important products or services,” though.5   
At the time this decree was issued, the proliferation of loss-making SOEs, 
which were predominantly small-scale local SOEs, was a major concern to the policy 
makers.  According to Tran Hoang Kim and Le Thu [1992: 64–65], in 1989, there were 
                                                  
3 Council of Ministers Chairman Instruction 393 of 25 November 1991. 
4 Council of Ministers Decree 315 of 1 September 1990. 
5 Van Arkadie and Mallon [2003: 149] notes that “strategic state enterprise was not 
defined, but was understood to include enterprises that contributed to national defense, 
public utilities and enterprises producing basic factors of production (for example, steel 
and cement), and key services such as banking.” 
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some 12,000 SOEs nationwide, of which 10,389 were under local management.  In the 
same year, up to 4,584 SOEs were operating with losses, about 90% of which were 
small-scale local SOEs.  As a result of the restructuring in the early 1990s, the total 
number of SOEs reduced by nearly half to 6,310 in 1995, of which 4,463 were local 
SOEs (Riedel and Turley [1999: 33]). 
The reduction in the number of SOEs was achieved mainly through mergers 
and liquidations.  About 3,000 enterprises were merged with other SOEs, and about 
2,000 liquidated, whose assets were generally sold to bidders from the state or private 
sector.  Most liquidated and merged enterprises were reportedly small-scale local SOEs 
with fewer than 100 employees.  The total assets of liquidated enterprises were 
estimated at less than 4% of total SOE assets (Van Arkadie and Mallon [2003: 
126–127]).  While the reduction in the number of enterprises was considerable, this 
phase of SOE restructuring presumably had only limited impact vis-à-vis the total 
volume of enterprise activities. 
Such features of the reform square with the findings from the statistics on 
industrial SOEs.6  During the 1990s, the number of industrial SOEs declined most 
significantly between 1991 and 1993 (Figure 1).  Most of the reduction fell on local 
SOEs, and the number of central SOEs remained largely unchanged throughout the 
1990s. 
 
Figure 1. Number of industrial SOEs in the 1990s (Unit: enterprise) 
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Source: GSO[1996], GSO[2000] 
 
Now, we will examine changes in the structure of industrial output value by 
local SOEs in the period when the major reduction in the number of local industrial 
                                                  
6 Industrial SOEs comprised about 30% of the total number of SOEs in 1995.   
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SOEs occurred.  The share of local SOEs in the total industrial output value of the 
country declined slightly between 1991 and 1994, from 21.7% to 20.1%.  Figure 2 
shows the trend of industrial output value by local SOEs in the same period.   
 
Figure 2. Trend of industrial output value by local SOEs at constant 1989 prices, 1991–1994 
(Unit: billion dong) 
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Source: GSO [1996] 
 
Between 1990 and 1994, while the number of local industrial SOEs decreased 
by nearly one-third, the individual output value in major industrial sectors by local 
SOEs, as well as the total industrial output value, was growing without apparent 
interruption.  Put differently, no drastic change in the sectoral structure of industrial 
output value is observed in this period.  The SOE restructuring in this stage did not 
seem to affect the sectoral structure of local SOEs (i.e., did not make them concentrate 
on, or withdraw from, particular sectors), at least within the industrial branch.   
 
2.2 Structure of the local SOE sector as of 2000 
The Vietnamese local SOE sector encompasses enterprises operating in a wide 
range of fields, including those generally supposed to be the public domain (such as 
water and waste disposal) and those that are not.  Before discussing the impact of SOE 
reform in the first decade of the twenty-first century, this section will briefly review the 
structure of the local SOE sector in terms of type of business.   
The breakdown of the number of enterprises and of their turnover by 
economic branches is demonstrated in Figure 3.  As to the number of establishments, 
up to 77% of local SOEs are found in four branches: manufacturing (25%), commerce 
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(19%), agriculture-forestry (18%), and construction (15%).  In terms of turnover, 
commerce takes up about half of all local SOE turnover, followed by manufacturing 
(27%) and construction (8%).  Average turnover of one local SOE is the highest in the 
finance-credit branch, followed by commerce.   
 
Figure 3. Structure of local SOEs by economic branches (2000) 
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Source: GSO [2002] 
 
On average, a Vietnamese province at the end of 2000 owned about 60 
enterprises under its management, consisting of 11 in agriculture-forestry (for instance, 
state-owned farms and plantations, enterprises providing breeding or irrigation services, 
etc.), one in fishery, one in mining, 15 in manufacturing, one in electricity-gas-water 
(mostly water), nine in construction, 12 in commerce, two in hotel-restaurant, two in 
transport-communication, one in finance-credit (mostly construction lottery), three in 
real estate rental-consulting, one in culture-sport (publishing, film-making, etc.) and one 
in community and personal services (waste disposal, drainage, etc.).   
In practice, the number and structure of local SOEs varied greatly between 
provinces.  As of the end of 2000, Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) had the largest number 
of local SOEs (303), and Binh Phuoc Province the smallest (16).   
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In the four branches where local SOEs concentrated most, enterprises were 
distributed rather unevenly among provinces, resulting in the above-mentioned variation 
of the local SOE sector.  In manufacturing, commerce and construction, the two big 
cities, HCMC and Hanoi, had far more enterprises than others.7  Even if the two cities 
were set aside, an average province in the Red River Delta (excluding Hanoi) owned 
two to three times more local SOEs than an average province in the Mekong Delta in 
these three branches.  In the agriculture-forestry branch, Dak Lak topped all provinces 
with 58 enterprises, and the average number of local SOEs in this branch among four 
Central Highlands provinces amounted to 32, whereas in the Mekong Delta, the average 
number of local agriculture-forestry SOEs per province was only two.   
In contrast, in other branches (fishery, mining, water, hotel, transportation, 
finance, real estate rental, culture and community/personal services), differences in the 
number of local SOEs among provinces were much less significant, with many 
provinces having zero to two enterprises, and more than 90% of all provinces having 
zero to five enterprises in each branch.  It can be said that, roughly speaking, 
enterprises that serve the public interest tend to be found in the latter group of branches, 
and those that engage in business activities side by side with private sector actors tend 
to be found in the former group of branches. 
 
3. Implementation of local SOE restructuring since 2000 
 
3.1 Guidelines provided in three Prime Minister Decisions 
Since the turn of the century, a second wave of local SOE restructuring has 
been observed.8  Major underpinning for this stage of restructuring was a series of 
Prime Minister Decisions on the classification of SOEs (both central and local).   
Decision 58 dated 26 April 2002 set criteria (based on field of operation, 
production scale, capital level, etc.) for classifying SOEs into categories such as 1) 
those in which the state would maintain 100% of the capital, 2) those to be equitized, in 
which the state would hold more than 50% of the shares, and others.  Before Decision 
58, there were similar provisions, such as Government Decree 44, which specified the 
kind of SOEs not to be equitized, and those to be equitized, in which the state would 
                                                  
7 The average number of local SOEs per province excluding HCMC and Hanoi was 12 in 
manufacturing, 10 in commerce, and eight in construction.  On the other hand, the 
number of local SOEs in HCMC in these branches was 120, 54 and 47, and that in 
Hanoi 76, 45 and 42, respectively.  Enterprises in these two cities comprise 21, 14 and 
16% of the total number of local SOEs in these three branches, respectively.   
8 On the overall trend of SOE reform and related institutional developments, see Ishida 
[2008], Cheshier et al. [2006] and Mekong Economics [2002], among others. 
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hold dominant shares, in a similar manner.  However, Decree 44 provided guidelines 
on the selection of enterprises to be equitized, whereas Decision 58 required the heads 
of supervisory institutions of SOEs to determine whether to maintain state ownership or 
not of all SOEs under their respective jurisdictions, based on the criteria set out in it.  
In that sense, this Decision is rather comparable with the Council of Minister Decree 
388 of 1991.   
A summary of Decision 58 is provided in Table 1.  As can be seen from the 
table, the Decision lists activities and other conditions for enterprises to be maintained 
as 100% state-owned and those in which the state would retain the dominant shares, 
grouped under two headings of “business enterprises” and “public welfare enterprises” 
respectively.  Enterprises that do not fall under the above categories are basically to be 
equitized, in which the state would maintain a lower degree of shares or no shares; those 
with state capital of less than five billion dongs are, if they failed to be equitized, to be 
sold or handed over to employees’ collectives; and business enterprises with chronic 
deficits or public welfare enterprises failing to fulfill their mandates are to be merged, 
dissolved or bankrupted.9  
 
Table 1. Summary of Decision 58 
SOEs to be 
maintained 
100% 
state-owned 
Business 
enterprises 
1) Those in state monopoly sectors (production and supply of 
explosives, toxic chemicals and radioactive substances, national 
electricity transmission systems, national and international 
communication axis networks and production of cigarettes) 
2) Those with capital of 20 billion dong or more, average 
contribution to state budget in the last three years of 3 billion dong 
or more, applying high technology, contributing to 
macroeconomic stabilization and operating in the following 
sectors: generation of electricity, exploration of certain important 
minerals such as crude oil and natural gas, coal, etc., manufacture 
of certain mechanical engineering products, manufacture of 
certain important consumer goods and foodstuffs, wholesale of 
food, wholesale of petroleum, etc.(19 items) 
3) Those which guarantee the needs for developing production and 
improving the material and spiritual life of rural people and ethnic 
minorities in mountainous and remote areas 
4) Those which have a special nature (publishing houses except 
textbook publishing, etc., construction lottery and those operating 
in important branches decided by the Prime Minister) 
Public 
welfare 
enterprises 
Those operating in the following sectors: printing bank notes, flight 
control, defense and security areas, publishing of textbooks, etc., 
management and maintenance of national railway and airport systems, 
management and maintenance of important road, waterway, and 
                                                  
9 Decree 103 of 1999 and Decree 49 of 2002 stipulate conditions, procedures, etc. for 
transferring (to employees’ collectives), selling, business contracting and leasing of 
SOEs.  Decree 180 of 2004 provides conditions, procedures, etc. for establishment, 
reorganization (such as merger or division) and dissolution of SOEs.   
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seaport systems, management and exploration of large-scale 
waterworks, water drainage in cities, public lighting, etc. (14 items) 
SOEs to be 
equitized, in 
which the state 
would retain 
dominant 
shares 
Business 
enterprises 
Those with capital of 10 billion dong or more, average contribution to 
state budget in the last three years of 1 billion dong, and operating in 
the sectors listed in 2) above.   
Others (manufacture of sugar, milk and edible oil, assessment of 
goods, printing except labels, marks and package, labor cooperation 
and trading in fair and exhibition floor space) 
Public 
welfare 
enterprises 
Those operating in the following sectors: manufacture of plant 
varieties, animal breeds and frozen sperms, offshore fishing, technical 
inspection of motorized means of transportation, management and 
maintenance of road and waterway systems, management and 
maintenance of important railway station and car terminals and 
management and exploration of waterworks 
Source: Prepared by the author based on 58/2002/QD-TTg 
 
Decision 58 has been revised twice by Decision 155 of 2004 and Decision 38 
of 2007.  As a result of these revisions, the scope of enterprises to remain as SOEs has 
basically become narrower.  If we simply count the fields of activity as listed in 
Decision 58, there were 41 items (including 27 for business enterprises and 14 for 
public welfare enterprises) for enterprises to remain as 100% state-owned, and 30 items 
(including 24 for business enterprises and six for public welfare enterprises) for those in 
which the state would retain dominant shares.10  Decision 38, on the other hand, lists 
only 19 items for the former and 26 for the latter.11  Table 2 shows a summary of 
Decision 38. 
 
Table 2. Summary of Decision 38 
SOEs to be 
maintained 
100% 
state-owned 
(Article 1) 
Those operating in the following sectors: production and supply of explosives, toxic 
chemicals and radioactive substances, defense and security areas, management and 
exploration of national and urban railways, flight control, radio and television, 
construction lottery, publishing, newspapers and journals, printing and coining of 
money, production of cigarettes, management and exploration of large-scale 
irrigation systems, planting and protecting headwater forests, policy based finance, 
etc. (19 items) 
                                                  
10 Actually, some of these “items” in Decision 58 include a number of products.  For 
instance, “production of some important consumer goods and foodstuff” is counted as 
one item here, but includes six products (newsprint and writing paper, textiles and 
fibers, over 3 billion pages/year of printing, salt, over 50 million liter/year of beer and 
over 10 million liter/year of alcohol and liquor).  
11 In addition, “business SOEs that fulfill the needs for developing production and 
improving material and spiritual life of rural people and ethnic minorities in 
mountainous and remote areas” and “SOEs operating in important branches decided by 
Prime Minister” are included in the category of enterprises to be maintained as 100% 
state-owned in Decision 58.  In Decision 38, “business SOEs that guarantee the needs 
for developing production and improving material and spiritual life of ethnic minorities 
in mountainous and remote areas” are among those in which the state is to retain 
dominant shares.   
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SOEs to be 
equitized, in 
which the state 
would retain 
dominant 
shares (Article 
2) 
Those 
producing and 
supplying 
products or 
services of 
public interest 
(Clause 1) 
Maintenance of national railway system, production of scientific 
films, newsreels, documentaries and films for children, drainage in 
cities, public lighting in cities, basic geological and meteorological 
surveys, production and preservation of plant varieties, animal 
breeds and frozen sperms, production of vaccines, etc. (9 items)  
Those which guarantee the needs for developing production and improving the 
material and spiritual life of ethnic minorities in mountainous and remote areas 
(Clause 2)  
Those playing a 
role of 
guaranteeing 
macroeconomic 
balance and 
market stability 
(Clause 3) 
Generation of electricity with capacity of 100 MW or more, 
exploration of important minerals such as coal, exploration and 
processing of crude oil and natural gas, building and repairing of 
means of air transportation, production of pig iron and steel with 
capacity of 300,000 tons per year, production of basic chemicals, 
chemical fertilizer and plant protection drugs, planting and 
processing rubber and coffee, manufacture of newsprint and 
high-quality writing paper, wholesale of food, wholesale of 
petroleum, production of beer over 100 million liters per year, etc. 
(17 items)  
Source: Prepared by the author based on 38/2007/QD-TTg 
 
It is worth noting that Decisions 58 and 155 also stipulate criteria for General 
Corporations (GCs) in terms of sector, capital level, contribution to state budget and 
competitiveness.  Existing GCs that do not meet these criteria shall be reorganized by 
merging or dissolving.  Regarding the criteria for GCs, these two Decisions have 
almost the same contents (listing 16 sectors, setting minimum capital as 500 billion 
dong in principle, etc.).   
What are the main features of the SOE restructuring policy in the 2000s 
embodied in these three Prime Minister Decisions?  Firstly, it can be said that, as in the 
Council of Ministers Decree 388, SOEs that are “large-scale” or “providing important 
products or services” are excluded from the object of restructuring.  However, in this 
new phase of SOE restructuring, only these enterprises are to be maintained as SOEs.  
Those that fall outside of these categories, even if they are profitable, are not intended to 
be maintained as SOEs.   
Secondly, the definition of “large-scale” or “important products or services” 
has become reasonably clear.  Moreover, generally speaking, many of those activities 
listed in Article 1 and Clause 1, Article 2 of Decision 38 are not wide of the mark as 
activities of public enterprises in any market economy.  The move from Decision 58 to 
Decision 38 can also be seen as one to focus more on essential activities for public 
enterprises in a market economy.  On the other hand, Section 3, Article 2 of Decision 
38, as well as the provisions on GCs, still include a variety of important industries for 
Vietnam.   
Another distinct feature is that those enterprises subject to restructuring can, if 
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judged commercially viable, continue to exist as independent enterprises through 
equitization.  Since the 1990s, experiences of equitization have accumulated and an 
appropriate legal framework has developed, which has made it a viable option for the 
state to maintain those enterprises that do not need to remain as SOEs while 
withdrawing its stakes in them.  This in turn would enable the state to limit the scope 
of SOE activities as mentioned above without much socio-economic disruption.   
 
3.2 Provincial SOE restructuring master plans (2003–2005) 
 The question then arises: How has the national policy on SOE reform 
examined above been implemented at the local level?  As mentioned earlier, Decision 
58 required the heads of the ministries, provincial People’s Committees and GCs 91, to 
apply its guidelines to all SOEs under their authority and build comprehensive master 
plans.  In response, 104 master plans for 2003–2005 were submitted to and approved 
by the Prime Minister, of which 61 were prepared by localities. 
 These master plans were later revised in accordance with the revision of 
Decision 58: the original master plans 2003–2005 were partially revised to make master 
plans 2005–2006, which were followed by master plans 2006–2010.  Considering the 
fact that the 2005 Enterprise Law stipulates that the transformation of SOEs into either 
limited liability or joint-stock companies shall be completed by mid-2010, this phase of 
SOE restructuring is supposed to be wrapped up in 2010.12   
 Here we would like to focus on the contents of the 61 provincial master plans 
for the period 2003–2005.  These master plans are not structured in a way fully 
corresponding to the categories of Decision 58.  Table 3 is an attempt to sort out the 
information provided in these master plans.   
  
                                                  
12 However, in 2008, due to the difficulties in the stock market, the target of 
transforming the ownership form of all SOEs by 2010 seems to have been postponed 
(“SOE restructuring speeds up,” Viet Nam News, 14/07/2008).   
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Table 3. Overview of the 61 provincial master plans for SOE restructuring (2003–2005) 
Categories No. of enterprises
SOEs in which the state maintains 100% of the capital 960 
? Public welfare enterprises 332 
? Business enterprises 577
? Unknown 45 
? One-member limited liability companies 6 
SOEs to be equitized 1,330 
? In which the state retains more than 50% of the shares 338 
? In which the state retains at least 51% of the shares in the first offering 185 
? In which the state retains a lower degree of shares or no shares  777 
? Unknown 30 
Others 570 
? Merged 248 
? Transferred to workers’ collective, sold  124 
? Business contracting, lease 9 
? Dissolved, bankrupted  112 
? Transferred to under management of other organizations such as GCs 35 
? Transformed into public service unit 42 
Unknown 26 
State-owned farms and plantations 149 
Source: Prepared by the author based on MPI[2004]   
Notes: 1) Some 100 state-owned farms and plantations are included in the categories of “public welfare 
enterprises” and “business enterprises” to be maintained as 100% state-owned. 
2) Master plans of 29 out of 61 provinces have the category “To be equitized: in which the state 
retains at least 51% of the shares in the first offering,” which does not appear in Decision 58.  
It is not clear what kind of enterprises fall in this category.  
 
 It is not easy to pin down the number of SOEs at the beginning of these plans, 
as the plans include such cases as newly establishing an enterprise by separating a part 
of existing SOEs, but if we take the sum of the enterprise numbers in all categories in 
the list for approximation, it makes up 3,035.  As to the number of SOEs most 
probably remaining at the end of these plans, we would sum up the number of 
enterprises in four categories: “Enterprises in which the state maintains 100% of the 
capital,” “Enterprises to be equitized, in which the state retains more than 50% of the 
shares,” “Enterprises to be equitized, in which the state retains at least 51% of the shares 
in the first offering” and “State-owned farms and plantations,” which adds up to 1,632, 
some 54% of the number of enterprises at the beginning of the plans.13   
                                                  
13 Regarding state-owned farms and plantations, many of them are treated separately 
from other SOEs as there are a set of legal documents specifically on the reform of these 
entities, such as Decree 170 and Decree 200 of 2004.  In a nutshell, state-owned farms 
and plantations shall be transformed into appropriate organizational forms based on 
their main purpose (whether business or public welfare), and those judged to be 
inefficient shall be dissolved.  In 2006 and 2007, 314/342 farms and 353/355 
 13
 There is a difference of about 300 between the above figure at the beginning of 
the planning period and the number of SOEs as of the end of 2002 in the Statistical 
Yearbook.  Presumably, this difference is mainly explained by the fact that the 
Statistical Yearbook data include many enterprises that are in the process of 
equitization.14  Overall, these plans do seem comprehensive.  Some of these plans 
even note the deadline for reporting to the Prime Minister on cases which the local 
authorities for some reasons could not determine how to handle by the time the plans 
were made.   
 What can be inferred from this table?  Firstly, equitization has in practice 
become a principal measure in restructuring SOEs.  In this first set of master plans, the 
number of SOEs to be equitized has already far exceeded that of SOEs to be maintained 
as 100% state-owned. 
 Having said that, of the SOEs to be equitized, only about 60% would be 
de-nationalized right away.  The master plans also include not a few enterprises to be 
merged with other SOEs or transferred to positions under the management of central 
GCs.  About one out of five enterprises to be reduced would be neither de-nationalized 
nor dissolved. 
 Nevertheless, if we add up the numbers of enterprises to be de-nationalized 
through equitization, dissolved or bankrupted, and sold or transferred to workers’ 
collectives, that would amount to about one-third of the total number of enterprises at 
the beginning of the plans.  In other words, one-third of all local SOEs were to be 
reduced more or less substantively, which is indeed significant at least in terms of 
number.  
 The question then is the substance of the reduction: what kind of enterprises 
were to be crossed out from the list of SOEs and what kind of enterprises remained?  
The provincial master plans only indicate names of enterprises, but names often do 
contain some words suggesting the enterprise’s line of business.  A rough count of 
such names shows that, of the 960 enterprises to remain as 100% state-owned in the 
master plans, there are some 110 state-owned farms and plantations, some 110 irrigation 
                                                                                                                                                  
plantations were thus transformed into farm/forest products companies under state 
control.   
14 According to the National Steering Committee for Enterprise Reform and 
Development (NSCERD), in 2004, equitizing a local SOE took 422 days on average (“Co 
phan hoa doanh nghiep nha nuoc: Can co su quyet tam tu nhieu phia”, Sai Gon Giai 
Phong, 25/2/2005).  Besides, there are local SOEs that belong to organizations other 
than provincial People’s Committees, such as local branches of the Party and other 
organizations, or district People’s Committees, which are likely to be omitted from the 
provincial master plans.   
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companies, some 60 water companies, some 60 construction lottery companies, some 
35 road management and repair companies, some 35 printing companies, some 30 urban 
environment companies, some 20 publishing houses, film companies and companies 
producing other cultural materials, some 15 automobile inspection companies and some 
15 textbook and school equipment companies (altogether they comprise more than half 
of the 960 enterprises).  There are also not a few enterprises whose names include such 
terms as housing, public works, breeding, (management of) parks, terminals or seaports 
and mining.   
 Admittedly, the company names suggest that the group of enterprises to remain 
as 100% state-owned is composed of somewhat more diverse enterprises than implied 
by Decision 58.  Nevertheless, many of them do seem to be in line with the intention 
of the Decision.  A substantial part of the enterprises in this category are associated 
with some public services or activities of public interest.  Furthermore, the 100% 
state-owned enterprises are to comprise about 65% of remaining local SOEs when the 
plans have been implemented.15  At the individual province level, only six provinces 
would have more enterprises with dominant state shares than those 100% state-owned; 
on the other hand, in four provinces, all remaining local SOEs would be 100% 
state-owned.16 
 In sum, the provincial master plans seem to essentially reflect the national 
guidelines on SOE restructuring, although the planning did not involve an automatic 
application of criteria.  Consequently, it is foreseen that close to half of the total 
number of local SOEs existing at the beginning of the planning period would be 
reduced within three years.  Even excluding those mergers and transfers within the 
state-owned sector, the “substantive” reduction would amount to one-third of the total.  
Allowing for the generally small size of enterprises to be restructured, still it would be 
fair to say that the implementation of these master plans is expected to have some 
visible impact upon the local SOE sector.17 
                                                  
15 Excluding state-owned farms and plantations.  SOEs equitized prior to the 
preparation of these master plans in which the state retains dominant shares are 
disregarded here. 
16 The former group of provinces include Hai Duong, Quang Ninh, Tay Ninh, Binh 
Thuan, An Giang and Ben Tre, and the latter group include Ha Tay, Bac Ninh, Kon Tum 
and Binh Phuoc. 
17 To what degree these master plans have actually been implemented is unknown to 
the author, but it seems likely to be considerable.  For instance, according to Official 
Letter 152 of NSCERD dated 29 November 2004, in the first 11 months of 2004, Hanoi 
has achieved 89.3% of the SOE reform plan (equitization only), HCMC 76.5%, and Hai 
Phong 71%.  Seemingly the achievement rate is calculated based on annual plans that 
include cases carried over from the year before.  The World Bank has been supporting 
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4. Statistical changes in the local SOE sector (2000–2006) 
 
This section will mainly examine the data from Statistical Yearbooks and 
Enterprise Censuses to observe changes in the local SOE sector under the current SOE 
restructuring drive.   
 
4.1 Size of the local SOE sector and of an average local SOE 
 Firstly, changes in the size of the local SOE sector, in terms of number of 
enterprises, number of workers and turnover, are shown in Table 4.  Between 2000 and 
2006, the total number of local SOEs declined from 3,692 to 1,962, a decrease of some 
47%.18  Looking at the year-on-year trend, from 2000 to 2004 (excluding 2002), the 
total number of local SOEs was reduced by about 10%, and in 2005 and 2006, 
13%–14%, maintaining the pace of reducing some 300 or more a year.19  As to the size 
of labor in the local SOE sector, after the peak year of 2002, it has also contracted with 
increasing speed: the change between 2000 and 2006 is minus 33%.  Regarding 
turnover, while the actual figure shows an increase of some 50% over the six years, the 
local SOE share in the total enterprise turnover has been steadily declining over time.   
 
Table 4. Total number of enterprises, employees and turnover in the local SOE sector since 2000 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of enterprises 3,692  3,358 3,311 2,947 2,629 2,261  1,962 
YOY - -9.0% -1.4% -11.0% -10.8% -14.0% -13.2%
Share in all enterprises 8.7% 6.5% 5.3% 4.1% 2.9% 2.0% 1.5% 
Number of employees 787,321  762,846 815,438 800,988 732,511 605,201  526,633 
YOY - -3.1% 6.9% -1.8% -8.5% -17.4% -13.0%
Share in all enterprises 22.3% 19.4% 17.5% 15.5% 12.7% 9.7% 7.8% 
Turnover 127,777  125,392 144,379 161,445 175,826 175,002  189,696 
YOY - -1.9% 15.1% 11.8% 8.9% -0.5% 8.4% 
Share in all enterprises 15.8% 14.0% 12.1% 11.2% 10.2% 8.1% 7.1% 
Source: GSO[2008a] 
 
 Nationwide, the share of local SOEs in the total enterprise workforce has 
                                                                                                                                                  
a project to monitor the implementation of the 104 SOE restructuring master plans. 
18 Regarding such data as the number of enterprises, there are some discrepancies 
between the Statistical Yearbooks and the Enterprise Censuses, seemingly because the 
Censuses use preliminary figures.  For instance, the number of local SOEs as of the 
end of 2000 is 3,692 by the Statistical Yearbook and 3,654 by the Enterprise Census. 
19 Considering the fact that the definition of SOEs was broadened in 2003, the 
substantive decrease is supposed to be somewhat larger.   
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declined from 22% to 8%, and that in the total enterprise turnover from 16% to 7%, 
between 2000 and 2006.20  The changes seem even more drastic at the individual 
provincial level.  Table 5 shows the distribution of provinces according to the local 
SOE share of enterprise labor and turnover, respectively.  The median value of local 
SOE share in both enterprise labor and turnover dropped to less than one-third in this 
six-year period.21   
 
Table 5. Local SOE share of number of employees and turnover in all enterprises by province 
No. of employees in Local SOEs / 
No. of employees in all enterprise 
Number of provinces 
Year 2000 Year 2006  
60? + 8 0 
50? - 60? 5 0 
40? - 50? 16 0 
30? - 40? 11 4 
20? - 30? 12 15 
10? - 20? 7 22 
Less than 10? 2 23 
Turnover of local SOEs / Turnover 
of all enterprises  
Number of provinces 
Year 2000 Year 2006 
60? + 4 0 
50? - 60? 7 0 
40? - 50? 10 0 
30? - 40? 18 4 
20? - 30? 10 10 
10? - 20? 8 22 
Less than 10? 4 28 
Source: GSO[2002], GSO[2008b] 
 
 Next, changes in geographical distribution of local SOEs will be examined.  
As noted earlier, an average province in 2000 had 60 local SOEs, whereas the number 
decreased to 31 in 2006.22  In 2006, only the two largest cities, HCMC and Hanoi, had 
more than 100 local SOEs (229 and 127, respectively).  The province with the smallest 
number of local SOEs was Ha Giang Province, which had only two.  Five provinces 
had 10 or fewer local SOEs, and up to 24 provinces had 20 or fewer.   
                                                  
20 This rapid decline presumably resulted from both the progress of restructuring in the 
local SOE sector and relatively fast growth in other sectors.   
21 In localities that have a large local SOE sector, such as HCMC and Hanoi, the 
presence of local SOEs in the local economy tends to be relatively small.  That is why 
the median value of provincial data is different from the national average.  It is worth 
noting, however, that the statistical figures on enterprise workers or turnover generally 
exaggerate the differences between large cities and other localities, as they are counted 
in a locality where the enterprise’s head office is located.   
22 The number of provinces was 61 in 2000 and 64 in 2006. 
 17
 Changes in average number of local SOEs per province by region are shown in 
Figure 4.  Even excluding HCMC and Hanoi, in 2000, there were substantial regional 
disparities in average number of local SOEs per province, ranging from 31.5 in the 
Mekong Delta region to 84.5 in the North Central Coast.  The gap had narrowed 
considerably by 2006, when the smallest average number of local SOEs per province 
was 20.1 in the North Eastern region and the largest 37.0 in the North Central Coast 
(excluding the two biggest cities).23   
 
Figure 4. Number of local SOEs per province by region (Unit: enterprise) 
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Source: GSO[2002], GSO[2008b] 
 
 If local SOEs are primarily reduced in the branches where they compete with 
private enterprises, it is not difficult to predict that such equalization would follow as 
restructuring proceeds, since the distribution of local SOEs among localities was most 
uneven in these branches, as mentioned earlier.  It follows, then, that the equalization 
in the geographical distribution of local SOEs is likely to accompany a certain degree of 
standardization in the structure of the SOE sector with a set of public welfare enterprises 
at its core.   
 At the individual enterprise level, firstly, enterprises with a low level of capital 
decreased in both absolute and relative terms (Table 6).  The proportion of enterprises 
                                                  
23 On the other hand, the concentration of local SOEs in the two biggest cities has 
increased somewhat: 15% of the total number of local SOEs were located in the two 
cities in 2000, which increased to 18% in 2006.  Of other centrally controlled cities, Hai 
Phong has relatively numerous local SOEs, but the number of local SOEs in Da Nang 
and Can Tho (established in 2004) is close to the national average.   
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with more than 10 billion dong in capital rose from 45% of all local SOEs in 2000 to 
72% in 2006 (for comparison, the same ratio for central SOEs was 80% in 2000 and 
90% in 2006).  Average capital per enterprise almost quadrupled from 26.8 billion 
dong in 2000 to 102.6 billion dong in 2006.  In other words, while the number of local 
SOEs halved in this period, the total capital of the local SOE sector doubled.  It shows 
that, while sorting out smaller enterprises, the local authorities have also strived to 
increase the capital of large ones.  The number of local SOEs with more than 200 
billion in capital has tripled within the six years.   
  
Table 6. Breakdown of local SOEs by size of capital (Unit: enterprise) 
 
Total 
Less 
than 0.5 
billion 
dong 
0.5?1 
billion 
dong 
1?5 
billion 
dong 
5?10 
billion 
dong 
10?50 
billion 
dong 
50?200 
billion 
dong 
200?
500 
billion 
dong 
500 
billion 
dong or 
more 
Year 2000 3,654 102 134 1,078 687 1,205 376 60 12 
Year 2006 1,962 19 17 249 274 735 448 148 72 
Source: GSO[2002], GSO[2008b] 
 
 Secondly, the average number of employees per enterprise in the local SOE 
sector was 268, and the average turnover 96.7 billion dong, in 2006, a 25% and 178% 
increase from 2000, respectively.  The regional disparities regarding average size of 
capital and turnover of local SOEs have increased (Table 6, Table 7).   
 
Figure 5. Average capital of a local SOE by region (Unit: billion dong) 
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Source: GSO[2002], GSO[2008b] 
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Figure 6. Average turnover of a local SOE by region (Unit: billion dong) 
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Source: GSO[2002], GSO[2008b] 
 
 Thus, changes in various indicators suggest the impact of SOE restructuring in 
the 2000s.  The number of local SOEs has fallen considerably, as has the number of 
employees in the sector, while the average size of a local SOE has increased.  Aside 
from the two biggest cities, regional disparities in the average number of local SOEs per 
province have narrowed, which also implies that the sectoral structure of local SOEs has 
been standardized to a certain extent.  On the other hand, more resources have been 
concentrated in large-scale local SOEs, seemingly resulting in a greater disparity 
between localities that possess such enterprises and those that do not.   
 
4.2 Changes in the sectoral sStructure of local industrial SOEsin the industry 
branch 
 Now we examine whether the sectoral structure of local SOEs has actually 
changed as expected, by focusing on industrial SOEs again.  Figure 7 shows the trend 
in the industrial output value in the manufacturing branch from 2000 to 2006.24   
 
                                                  
24 The categorization in the industrial statistics in the statistical yearbooks has 
changed since 1995.  Therefore, the data in Section 2 of this paper and those in this 
section are based on different classification methods.   
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Figure 7. Trend of industrial output value by local SOEs at constant 1994 prices, 2000–2006 
(Unit: billion dong) 
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Source: GSO [2008a] 
 
 It is the first time since the beginning of the 1990s for the total industrial output 
value by local SOEs to decline in absolute terms.25  It started to decline after 2004, as a 
result of output value decreases in many sectors.  This trend is clearly observed in such 
sectors as food, textile, leather and non-metal mineral products manufacturing.  These 
sectors are not included in the list of business fields where the state maintains its control 
over enterprises, except for large-scale enterprises producing certain products.   
 On the other hand, some sectors have been growing steadily both before and 
after 2004, and thus increased their shares in the industrial output value by local SOEs.  
These include tobacco, electrical machinery and apparatus and publishing and printing.  
Tobacco and publishing are two of the sectors reserved for 100% state-owned 
enterprises in Decision 38.  Manufacturing of electrical machinery and apparatus was 
included in the list of activities for 100% state-owned enterprises in Decision 58 and for 
enterprises with dominant state shares in Decision 155 (with certain capital and other 
requirements).   
 It would be reasonable to assume that the number of local SOEs is decreasing 
in the sectors where local SOE output value is clearly declining.  As far as the 
                                                  
25 The share of local SOEs in the total industrial output value halved from 14.1% in 
2000 to 7.3% in 2006. 
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manufacturing branch is concerned, it seems that the SOE restructuring in the 2000s has 
actually been proceeding selectively based on enterprises’ line of business as a major 
criterion.  The trend shown above is just a recent phenomenon, but it corresponds with 
the orientation of SOE reform policy examined above.  Therefore, it is expected to 
continue unless the reform orientation changes.  If this can be generalized in other 
branches, too, it would follow that the structure of the local SOE sector has indeed been 
changing basically in line with the guidelines provided in the three Prime Minister 
Decisions.   
 
5. Large-scale local SOEs 
 
In this final section, we would like to look at the features of large-scale local 
SOEs remaining in the mid-2000s. 
We use a survey of the 200 largest companies in Vietnam (Cheshier and 
Penrose [2007]) as a starting point.  The authors of this survey ranked all enterprises in 
Vietnam by number of employees, assets and turnover, and compiled a list of the top 
200 enterprises based on the average of these individual ranks.  There are 29 local 
SOEs in the Domestic Top 200 list (which excluded 100% foreign invested 
enterprises).26  Table 7 indicates the names, main line of business and location of these 
29 local SOEs.  They are either local SOEs under the SOE Law or local one-member 
limited liability companies as of when the survey was conducted.  Some of the 
enterprises in the list have already been equitized (including APTCO, DOCIMEX and 
TANIMEX), and a number of others (including the parent companies of GCs and other 
enterprise groups under the parent-subsidiary company model) are in the pipeline for 
equitization by 2010.   
 
Table 7. Twenty-nine large local SOEs in the mid-2000s (Ranks are those in the Domestic Top 200 list) 
Rank English name Short name Sector Province 
24 Saigon Tourist Holding Company Saigontourist Hotels HCMC 
29 Hanoi Public Service and Transportation Co. TRANSERC
O 
Passenger transport Hanoi 
37 Khanh Viet Corporation KHATOCO Manufacture of tobacco products Khanh Hoa
40 HCMC Water Supply Co SAWACO Distribution of water HCMC 
50 Thanh Le Commercial Import Export Co THALEXIM Wholesale of crude oil Binh 
Duong 
85 Can Tho Agricultural and Animal Products CATACO Processing and preserving of fish Can Tho 
                                                  
26 The Domestic Top 200 list includes 117 central SOEs under the SOE Law, two central 
one-member limited liability companies, 14 joint ventures between SOEs and foreign 
partners, eight joint-stock or limited liability companies with the dominant state shares, 
etc.   
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Company and fish products 
88 Binh Duong Trading Investment and 
Development Corporation 
BECAMEX Building of complete 
constructions or parts thereof; 
civil engineering 
Binh 
Duong 
93 Hanoi General Production and Import-Export 
Company 
HAPROSIME
X 
Manufacture of wearing apparel Hanoi 
97 Phu Yen Material Company PYGEMACO Wholesale of crude oil Phu Yen 
100 Vissan Import Export Corporation Vissan Production, processing and 
preserving of meat and meat 
products 
HCMC 
103 Can Tho Sea Product Processing Export 
Enterprise 
CASEAFOO
D 
Processing and preserving of fish 
and fish products 
Hau Giang 
105 Saigon Agriculture Corporation SAGRI Manufacture of fertilizers and 
nitrogen compounds 
HCMC 
124 Binh Duong Production and Import Export Co. PROTRADE Manufacture of wearing apparel Binh 
Duong 
127 Hanoi Trade Corporation HAPRO Wholesale of agricultural and 
forestry raw materials 
Hanoi 
129 Saigon Transportation Mechanical Corporation  SAMCO Repair of motor vehicles  HCMC 
131 An Giang Agriculture and Foods Import Export 
Co. 
AFIEX Wholesale of grains An Giang 
144 Ninh Thuan Agricultural Products Export Co. NITAGREX Manufacture of other food 
products  
Ninh Thuan
145 Dong Nai Agricultural Products and Food 
Processing Import Export Co 
DONAFOOD
S 
Manufacture of bakery products Dong Nai 
152 Aquatic Food Trading Company APTCO Processing and preserving of fish 
and fish products 
HCMC 
162 Hanoi Clean Water Company ?  Collection, purification of water Hanoi 
166 HCMC Urban Environment Co CIENCO Solid waste disposal  HCMC 
170 Dak Lak Rubber Co. DAKRUCO Growing of industrial trees Dak Lak 
172 Saigon Culture Company SCPC Publishing, printing and 
reproduction of recorded media 
HCMC 
180 Dong Thap Import Export Trading Co DOCIMEX Wholesale of grains Dong Thap
184 Production Service Import Export Co.  TANIMEX Renting of land  HCMC 
195 Ben Thanh Tobacco Co ?  Manufacture of tobacco products HCMC 
136 Tin Nghia Import Export Co TIMEXCO Wholesale of crude oil Dong Nai 
163 Saigon Petro Co Saigon Petro Wholesale of crude oil HCMC 
165 Thang Long Metal Ltd. ?  Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools 
and general hardware 
Hanoi 
Source: Cheshier and Penrose [2007]    
Notes: 1) Three enterprises from the bottom are local one-member limited liability companies. 
      2) Some enterprises in the list seem to apparently belong to organizations other than provincial People’s 
Committees, and thus not covered in the provincial master plans. 
 
 Firstly, it is noted that, as expected, many of the largest enterprises are located 
in HCMC and Hanoi, while large-scale enterprises also exist in other provinces.  In 
terms of region, southern provinces tend to have large enterprises.  Of the 29 
enterprises, 21 belong to provinces in the South East and Mekong Delta regions (of 
which 11 belong to HCMC).   
 Secondly, the list includes not a few GCs established recently.  Nine GCs and 
one member company of a GC are found in the list, according to the information 
available to the author.27  Of the nine GCs, up to seven were established after 2000.28  
                                                  
27 Ben Thanh Tobacco Co. is also counted as a GC here as it was transformed into the 
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Also, including non-GCs, at least 12 enterprises are operating under the 
parent-subsidiary company model. 29   This demonstrates that the integration and 
enlargement of large enterprises have been proceeding together with the restructuring of 
small enterprises.   
 Thirdly, many of these enterprises operate in sectors where they compete with 
private actors.  There do exist enterprises providing major public services such as 
water (2), waste disposal (1) and public transportation (1),30 but they are just one part.  
Some others including those dealing with tobacco manufacturing, publishing and 
wholesale of petroleum are operating in fields where the state sector so far maintains its 
monopoly.  Others are operating in fields where private enterprises are also active.  
For instance, of the 29 enterprises, 13 engage in manufacturing, up to seven of which 
seem to mainly engage in light industry products production for export such as 
processing of agricultural or fishery products.  Most large enterprises are operating in 
more than one line of business: taking these “side businesses” of large enterprises into 
consideration, the area for SOE-private competition would be even larger.   
 Fourthly, it is noticed that some large-scale local SOEs have changed their 
main line of business more than once in their not-so-long history, or are operating in 
multiple sectors that are very different from each other.  Typically, local SOEs seem to 
have changed their business orientation or explored new fields at such junctures as the 
loss of their roles under the central planning system, the loss of the major export market 
due to the disintegration of COMECON, merger with other enterprises under SOE 
restructuring and liberalization of import export activities to non-state businesses.31  At 
                                                                                                                                                  
parent company of the newly-established Saigon Industry Corporation in 2005.   
28 According to the website of the Ministry of Planning and Investment, as of the end of 
February 2000, there were 76 GCs (established under Decision 90/1994/QD-TTg) 
nationwide, of which only nine were under localities.   
29 On the parent-subsidiary company model, see Ishida [2008]. 
30 Only TRANSERCO operates passenger transportation as its main business, but 
SAMCO also provides public bus service.   
31 For instance, BECAMEX IDE Corp. in Binh Duong was originally established in 
1976 as Ben Cat General Trading Company, whose main activities were collecting and 
processing agricultural products and distributing consumer goods according to the state 
plans.  After merging with seven other loss-making SOEs in 1992, the company 
expanded its business into producing and selling local specialties such as coffee, rubber, 
pepper and wooden handicrafts.  Since 1996, in response to the liberalization of 
import-export activities, the company has proceeded to diversify its operations.  Now 
its main business is construction, while it is also active in industrial zone investment, 
securities, pharmaceutical production, etc.  BECAMEX IDC Corp. is the 49% 
shareholder of the Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park, which was planned as a model 
for industrial park development in Vietnam.  (FEI [2003: 425-428]; website of 
BECAMEX http://www.becamex.com.vn/)   
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a quick glance, it may seem that large-scale local SOEs tend to rest comfortably in 
protected and/or lucrative business, but they do seem to have had to successively adjust 
themselves to major environmental changes associated with the transition to a market 
economy.  Events such as the formation of GCs and parent-subsidiary companies 
under the current phase of SOE restructuring could also be seen in this context.   
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
 The current phase of SOE restructuring is still under way, and it is hard to say 
that we have enough data to even evaluate its achievements so far.  However, if we 
focus on its implementation at the local level, some signs of an important change can be 
observed.  Vietnamese localities had built up rather diverse local SOE sectors in 
response to factors such as their respective geographic conditions and socio-economic 
situations.  The ongoing SOE restructuring can be seen as an attempt to put an end to 
such a situation.  Local SOEs have been restricted to either more-typical pubic 
enterprises under a market economy or large-scale enterprises in major industries.  
Many of those falling outside of these two categories have been de-nationalized mainly 
through equitization.   
 Consequently, some degree of standardization of the local SOE sector among 
provinces seems to have been taking place, with a group of enterprises providing what 
could be broadly called public services as a common element.  On the other hand, a 
number of large local SOEs still continue to operate in the fields where private 
enterprises are also active, either as their main line of business or as a sideline.  These 
companies have indeed been assigned more resources, while smaller enterprises have 
undergone restructuring.  Nevertheless, even including these large enterprises, many 
indicators demonstrate that the presence of the local SOE sector is contracting, 
especially in areas generally not considered as the public domain.   
 One thing to note is that whether local SOEs have substantially withdrawn 
                                                                                                                                                  
  Another example is PYGEMACO in Phu Yen.  The company was established in 1981 
as Tuy Hoa Material Supply Company, which engaged in selling fertilizer, pesticide, 
cement, etc.  It was re-registered in 1992 as Phu Yen General Material Company.  In 
an effort to overcome the vulnerability of quota-dependent export activities, the 
company established a factory to process cashews for export in 1995.  Currently, it is 
one of the largest exporters of cashews in Vietnam.  In 1999, the first oil storage facility 
in Phu Yen invested by PYGEMACO started operation.  The company’s main business 
at present is wholesale of petroleum.  
(http://baophuyen.com.vn/portals/0/Quangcao/vtth/baopy.htm, retrieved 4 February 
2009) 
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from certain sectors in certain localities is a question to be verified.  The Vietnam 
Provincial Competitiveness Index survey which has been conducted by the Vietnam 
Competitiveness Initiative since 2005 uses a questionnaire which includes questions on 
issues such as the evaluation of provincial equitization policy and perception of 
provincial favoritism towards equitized local SOEs, in the eyes of private enterprises.  
The 2008 version of this survey reports that, of all enterprises that answered the 
question, 17% in the lowest province and 42% in the highest agreed to the statement 
that (provincial) favoritism towards equitized companies is an obstacle to their business.  
This suggests that there are cases (at least according to private enterprises’ perception) 
in which relations between local authorities and the “restructured” enterprises remain 
largely unchanged even though SOE reform has formally been proceeding.   
 Indeed, there are a number of other issues to be addressed, too, such as how the 
remaining enterprises fare in fulfilling their mandates, how the large-scale local SOEs 
would be further screened, and possible differences in reform approach among 
provinces and their consequences (in terms of impact on local budgets, local policy 
implementation, or public service delivery, for instance).  These are some of the 
possible topics for future research.   
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